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I. INTRODUCTION 
Bruce Springsteen, icon of the working class1 and well-known resident of the Third 
Circuit, 2 might have to put his pen to paper and pick to guitar once again in chronicling a new 
wrinkle in the plight of the workingman. However, Mr. Springsteen, the fittingly named 
"Boss,"3 would be venturing into "the treacherous waters of the [United States] Supreme Court's 
labor law successorship doctrine[,]" which has a "history of bedeviling courts" and fellow 
bosses4 alike. 5 The two most recent courts to be bedeviled by the successorship doctrine are the 
neighboring Second and Third Circuits. Their respective holdings in Local 348-S v. Meridian 
Management Corp. and AmeriSteel Corp. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters created a 
split between the circuits regarding the duty of successor employers to arbitrate. 6 
The successorship doctrine is set forth in a trilogy of United States Supreme Court 
decisions, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 7 NLRB v. Burns International Security 
Services, Inc., 8 and Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees9 (collectively, the 
"Successorship Trilogy" or "Trilogy"). These cases outline the duties imposed on a successor 
employer by an existing collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") between the predecessor 
1 Chet Flippo, Blue-Collar Troubadour, PEOPLE, Sept. 3, 1984, at 68. 
2 Bruce Springsteen, 'We Are a Confused But Noble Race ... ', N.J. MONTHLY, Nov. 15,2010, 
http://www.njmonthly.com/articles/lifestyle/people/we-are-a-confused-but-noble-race.html. 
3 Oliver Brett, What's in a nickname?, BBC NEWS (Jan. 15, 2009, 1:29PM), 
http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/78290 13 .stm. 
4 I.e., employers and labor unions. 
5 AmeriSteel Corp. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 267 F.3d 264,267 (3d Cir 2001); Local348-S v. Meridian Mgmt. 
Corp., 583 F.3d 65, 79 (2d Cir. 2009) (Livingston, J., dissenting); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Labor 
Law Successorship: A Corporate Law Approach, 92 MICH. L. REv. 203,203 (1993) ("Courts have struggled 
repeatedly to defme the legal obligations of the buyer of a business that has unionized workers.") 
6 See generally Martin Flumenbaum & Brad S. Karp, Successor Employers Bound By Prior Collective Bargaining 
Pact, 242 N.Y.L.J. 83 (Oct. 28, 2009) (noting that Meridian creates a split with the Third Circuit). 
7 376 U.S. 543 (1964) (holding that a successor employer could be bound to arbitrate with an incumbent union if 
substantial continuity of identity in the business enterprise exists). 
8 406 U.S. 272 (1972) (noting that a successor employer is not automatically bound to the substantive terms of the 
CBA between the predecessor employer and the incumbent union). 
9 417 U.S. 249 (1974) (holding that if substantial continuity of identity in the business enterprise does not exist, a 
successor employer will not be bound to arbitrate with an incumbent union). 
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employer and incumbent labor union. 10 However, Wiley and Burns have been viewed as 
standing in "direct conflict" with one another and have created a "tension ... in this trilogy," 
which Howard Johnson, the last case of the three, does not resolve. 11 
The two main unresolved issues of the trilogy, with whichAmeriSteel and Meridian 
struggle, are whether ( 1) an unconsenting successor employer has a duty to arbitrate any disputes 
with the incumbent union under the terms of the pre-existing CBA and (2) "the issue of whether 
and to what extent [the unconsenting successor] is bound by the [pre-existing CBA's] terms."12 
Regarding the first issue, in AmeriSteel, the Third Circuit arrived at the correct result by not 
requiring the successor to arbitrate after hiring the majority of the surviving predecessor's 
employees, but did so using logic that the dissent viewed as "flatly contradict[ing] the holding of 
Wiley." 13 In contrast, in Meridian, the Second Circuit does require such arbitration, but does so 
by relying too heavily upon the "substantial continuity of identity" factor established in Wiley. 
In doing so, it has set a dangerous precedent that will incentivize "would-be successor employers 
to simply [not hire] the unionized employees and start over."14 
Forcing new employers to arbitrate under the terms of an old CBA, whenever "substantial 
continuity of identity" in an existing workforce is present, will cause employers to refrain from 
rehiring unionized employees, so that they can "elude the grasp of the successorship doctrine."15 
Adopting Meridian's approach will cause new employers to "weigh the benefits of retaining 
experienced workers with the possibly lengthy pitfalls of litigating, appealing, arbitrating, and 
10 See generally Flumenbaum, supra, at 83 (discussing successor employer obligations). 
11 AmeriSteel, 267 F.3d at 268,270. 
12 Meridian, 583 F.3d at 66. 
13 AmeriSteel, 267 F.3d at 281 (Becker, C.J., dissenting). 
14 Meridian, 583 F.3d at 86 (Livingston, J., dissenting). 
15 Saks & Co. v. NLRB, 634 F.2d 681, 690 (2d Cir. 1980) (Meskill, J., dissenting). 
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potentially relitig(lting" when a duty to arbitrate is imposed on them. 16 Furthermore, choosing 
not to hire the predecessor's unionized workers, in an attempt to avoid a duty to arbitrate, will 
lead to inexperienced workers occupying these newly vacant positions, potentially resulting in an 
inferior work product and a greater probability of vicarious liability arising from employee 
negligence. 17 As a consequence, more skilled laborers would be unemployed, leading to greater 
industrial strife and social turmoil. 18 Therefore, from a public and economic policy standpoint, it 
would be more beneficial, in terms of long-term effects, not to impose a duty to arbitrate on 
successor employers in all instances. 
This Comment proposes, in a similar vein as Judge Livingston's dissent in Meridian, that 
a bright-line rule be imposed, requiring a duty to arbitrate under the terms of a pre-existing CBA 
(1) when a successor employer has implicitly or explicitly assumed the contract, (2) when a 
successor employer is an alter ago of the predecessor, (3) when a successor employer is a 
product of a merger with the predecessor, by which the predecessor ceases to exist, or ( 4) when 
both the "substantial continuity" test is satisfied and another analogous basis exists for imposing 
contractual liability (e.g., supporting state law). 19 In developing this argument, Part II sets forth 
the policy of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") and describes the collective bargaining 
process. This section also discusses the limitations placed on private employers and labor unions 
by the NLRA, the purpose and status of a CBA, and the impact of the duty to bargain when 
placed on employers. Part III then addresses the Supreme Court precedent on a successor 
employer's duty to arbitrate by discussing the Successorship Trilogy. Part IV turns to the current 
16 Kevin A. Teters, Case Note, Successor Employer's Obligations Under a Preexisting Collective Bargaining 
Agreement: The Second Circuit Misinterprets Supreme Court Decisions and Sets a Harmful Precedent, 76 J. AIRL. 
& COM. I43, I50 (2011). 
17 Wilson McLeod, Rekindling Labor Law Successorship In an Era of Decline, II HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 27I, 299 
(I994). 
18 See, e.g., Wiley, 376 U.S. at 549; Burns, 406 U.S. at 282. 
19 See Meridian, 583 F.3d at 84 (Livingston, J., dissenting). 
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split between the Courts of Appeals and the existing conflict in the Trilogy. Finally, Part V 
urges the Courts of Appeals to adopt a bright-line rule in imposing a duty to arbitrate on 
successor employers because such a rule would balance competing interests and conform to the 
parties' reasonable expectations. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Overview of the National Labor Relations Act and CBAs 
The main body of labor law governing collective bargaining between private employers 
and employees is the NLRA.20 The NLRA grants employees the right to affiliate themselves 
with labor unions and to bargain collectively with employers via unions or self-chosen 
representatives. 21 The fundamental purpose of collective bargaining is to establish wages, hours 
of employment, and other conditions of employment.22 These negotiated terms, rights, and 
duties of the parties are then organized into and agreed to by both parties in a written contract 
known as a CBA,23 which governs the relationship between labor unions and employers?4 
Under United States law, CBAs are not treated like ordinary contracts; rather, they enjoy 
an exalted status. 25 A CBA is "more than a contract; it is a generalized code to govern a myriad 
of cases which the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate. "26 The CBA covers the complete 
employment relationship and "calls into being a new common law- the common law of a 
particular industry or of a particular plant.''27 Despite the fact that a CBA is created by two 
20 29 u.s.c. §§ 151-169 (2000). 
2l 29 u.s.c. § 157. 
22 29 u.s.c. § 159. 
23 29 u.s.c. § 158(d). 
24 Mark E. Zelek, Labor Grievance Arbitration in the United States, 21 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 197, 197 
(1989). 
25 Wiley, 376 U.S. at 550. 
26 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & GulfNavigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578-579 (1960) (citing Dean 
Shulman, Reason, Contract, and the Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REv. 999, 1004-05 (1955)). 
27 !d. at 579. 
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parties, it is by no means "in any real sense the simple product of a consensual relationship." 28 
Under normal contract principles, a successor employer would not be bound to a predecessor's 
contract without consent.29 However, a CBA "is not an ordinary contract" and can be imposed 
on a successor employer.30 
In two well-defined scenarios, a successor employer is obliged to honor the pre-existing 
CBA. First, when it has expressly or impliedly assumed the CBA31 and, second, when it is 
simply an "alter ego" of the predecessor employer.32 A successor employer will be bound when 
it expressly assumes the CBA by voluntarily agreeing to the terms of the pre-existing CBA.33 
Likewise, when there is sufficient evidence to support a finding that a successor employer has 
impliedly agreed to be bound by the CBA, the successor is bound by the former CBA. 34 For 
example, in Audit Services, Inc. v. Rolfson, 35 a successor employer that continued making trust 
fund contributions on behalf of union workers and not doing so for non-union workers was 
bound to the CBA because it displayed a pattern of conforming to the terms of the CBA. 
In the second scenario, under the "alter ego" doctrine, the successor employer is "merely 
a disguised continuance of the old employer."36 Instances where a successor employer is in fact 
an alter ego of the predecessor "involve a mere technical change in the structure or identity of the 
28 Wiley, 376 U.S. at 550. 
29 !d. 
30 !d. 
31 Southward v. South Cent. Ready Mix Supply Corp., 7 F.3d 487,493 (6th Cir. 1993) ("[I]fa successor voluntarily 
assumes the obligations of its predecessor's CBA, then it will be bound by its predecessor's CBA.") 
32 Meridian, 583 F.3d at 79 (Livingston, J., dissenting). 
33 In Re Plaza Mission Bottling Co., 14 B.R. 428 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) (President of the subsequent company 
expressly stated at a meeting held prior to the formation of the new company that he would continue to observe the 
terms and conditions set forth in the CBA); United Steelworkers of America v. Deutz-Allis Corp., No. 86-0166-CV-
W-0, 1986 WL 6852, (W.D. Mo. Mar. 11, 1986) (successor announced in a letter that it had assumed the labor 
contract). 
34 See, e.g., NLRB v. Pine Valley Div. of Ethan Allen, Inc., 544 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1976) (successor employer 
continued to deduct union dues and made contributions to union's welfare account from employee paychecks, 
therefore successor conformed to the terms of the CBA). 
35 641 F.2d 757 (9th Cir. 1981) 
36 Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100, 106 (1942). 
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employing entity, frequently to avoid the effect of the labor laws, without any substantial change 
in ownership or management."37 The factors considered are whether the two entities have 
substantially identical stockholders, officers, directors, management, operations, equipment, and 
customers.38 An example of an alter ego successor relationship is when a family-operated 
business passes from the patriarch to another family member, who is also involved in operations, 
and that successor attempts to define the business as a new and separate entity .39 Because the 
new business entity shares the same management and is substantially identical to the 
predecessor, it would be found to be an alter ego.40 However, the duties of successorship beyond 
these two situations are contested. 
B. Overview of an Employer's Duty to Bargain 
In order to initiate the collective bargaining process that results in a CBA, the NLRA 
imposes a duty to bargain on employers when a majority of their employees are represented by a 
labor union.41 Even after the parties agree upon the terms of a CBA, the employer remains 
bound to negotiate and bargain by this duty throughout the relationship between the parties. 42 
For instance, an employer cannot make a unilateral change to any condition or requirement 
included in the CBA without notifying the union and providing it with an opportunity to 
negotiate. 43 
37 Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at261 n.5. 
38 Railroad Maintenance Laborers' Local1274 v. Kelly Railroad Contractors, Inc., 591 F.Supp. 889, 896 (N.D. Ill. 
1984) ("Important factors to consider are whether the two entities have substantially identical management, business 
purpose, operation, equipment, customers, supervisors and ownership ... The substantial continuity of the work 
force is frequently a major issue in alter ego determinations.") 
39 See generally Midwest Precision Heating and Cooling, Inc. v. NLRB, 408 F.3d 450 (8th Cir. 2005). 
40 ld at459. 
41 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). 
42 Union-Tribune Pub. Co., 353 NLRB No.2, at *12 (2008). 
43 !d. 
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However, successor employers are not always held to the duty to bargain when a 
predecessor employer transfers its business to the successor. 44 Even outside the two clear 
instances discussed, the duty to bargain as a successor employer arises when an employer 
acquires an organized business and there is "continuity of the business enterprise" between the 
old employer and new employer.45 In Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB,46 the 
Supreme Court put much confusion to rest regarding a successor employer's duty to bargain by 
establishing a factor-based test to determine the necessary "continuity of identity of the business 
enterprise."47 The existence of substantial continuity in the context of assessing a duty to bargain 
is determined by looking at: (1) whether the business of both employers is essentially the same; 
(2) whether the employees of the new company are doing the same jobs in the same working 
conditions under the same supervisors; and (3) whether the new entity has the same production 
process, produces the same products, and basically has the same body of customers.48 
Since successorship obligations will not be imposed when these factors are not met by a 
successor employer, a savvy employer therefore may attempt to avoid satisfying these factors, 
most notably by not hiring a majority of the predecessor's unionized employees in order to evade 
the duty to bargain.49 However, the refusal to hire an employee because of union membership 
constitutes an unfair labor practice, in violation of the NLRA. 50 Accordingly, unions sometimes 
claim that the absence of a majority of the predecessor's employees in the successor's work force 
to be attributable to discriminatory hiring by the successor. 51 
44 B. Glenn George~ Successorship and the Duty to Bargain, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 277, 279 (1988). 
45 Id 
46 482 u.s. 27 (1987). 
47 Meridian, 583 U.S. at 74. 
48 Id; Fall River, 482 U.S. at 43. 
49 George, supra, at 290. 
50 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(3). 
51 George~ supra~ at 290. 
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C. Overview of Arbitration's Role in Labor Law 
As comprehensive as a CBA might be, it is virtually impossible to provide for every 
contingency. Inevitably, disputes between the union and the employer will arise. 52 Usually, the 
parties acknowledge this reality and provide for an arbitration clause in the CBA, so that these 
disputes can be resolved through a grievance process culminating in binding arbitration. 53 
Arbitration has played a central role in effectuating national labor policy, 54 and it is federal 
policy to resolve labor disputes arising out of a CBA through arbitration. 55 Arbitration has been 
described as "the substitute for industrial strife," and as "part and parcel of the collective 
bargaining process itself. "56 
Ill. THE SUCCESSORSHIP TRILOGY 
A. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston 
In Wiley, the Supreme Court first introduced the idea that a successor employer could be 
bound by an arbitration clause in a CBA between the predecessor employer and its unionized 
employees. 57 In that case, Interscience Publishers, Inc. ("Interscience"), the predecessor 
employer, merged with John Wiley & Sons, Inc. ("Wiley"), and ceased to do business as a 
separate entity.58 Prior to the merger, an AFL-CIO union had represented certain Interscience 
employees and had entered into a CBA with Interscience. 59 After the merger, Wiley retained all 
oflnterscience's employees, but failed to recognize the union as a bargaining agent or fulfill any 
52 Jared S. Gross, Note, In Search ofWiley: Struggling to Bind Successor Corporations to Their Predecessor's 
Collective Bargaining Agreement, 29 OKLA. CITYU.L. REV. 113, 117 (2004). 
53 Paul Trapani, Note, Old Presumptions Never Die: Rethinking the Steelworker's Trilogy Presumption of 
Arbitration in Deciding the Arbitratability of Side Letters, 83 TuL. L. REV. 559, 559-560 (2008). 
54 Wiley, 376 U.S. at 549. 
55 United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960). 
56 Wiley, 376 U.S. at 549; Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., supra, at 578. 
57 AmeriSteel, 267 F.3d at 268. 
58 Wiley, 376 U.S. at 545. 
59 !d. at 544. 
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obligations llllder the Interscience CBA. 60 The union then brought suit against Wiley to compel 
arbitration under the CBA, claiming that Wiley was bound by the agreement's arbitration 
provision.61 Wiley argued that it was never a party to the CBA and that the merger effectively 
terminated the Interscience CBA. 62 
The Supreme Court concluded that Wiley had a duty to arbitrate with the union under the 
pre-existing CBA. 63 In arriving at that decision, the Court laid the groundwork for determining 
whether a successor employer has a duty to arbitrate. It held that "[ s ]ubstantial continuity of 
identity in the business enterprise" before and after the change must exist in order to require 
arbitration under the pre-existing CBA. 64 In Wiley, the Court regarded the "wholesale transfer of 
Interscience employees to the Wiley plant, apparently without difficulty[,]" as satisfying the 
"substantial continuity" condition.65 However, the Court left the "substantial continuity" concept 
undefined, leaving lower courts confused as to whether a duty to arbitrate was limited to the 
merger context, and as to what was "substantial" enough when a business continued after a 
change in ownership.66 
However, it should be noted that state successor liability law helped buttress the decision 
to require Wiley to arbitrate.67 The Court looked to New York Corporation Law, which holds 
that a merged corporation is liable on all contracts of both predecessor corporations.68 While 
60 ld at 545-546. 
61 Id at 545. 
62 Id at 547. 
63 Meridian, 583 F.3d at 68. 
64 Wiley, 376 U.S. at 551. 
65 ld 
66 See Meridian, 583 F.3d at 74; AmeriSteel, 267 F.3d at 268. 
67 !d. at 548. 
68 See ld; Meridian, 583 F.3d at 80 (Livingston, J., dissenting). 
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"the Supreme Court did not rely principally on common law successor liability rules in Wiley, it 
did refer to those principles as a partial explanation for its result."69 
Wiley also reiterated general principles of national labor policy, the role of arbitration, 
and the status of CBAs in forming its opinion. 70 The Court held that national labor policy 
favored arbitration as the means of settling labor disputes. 71 Arbitration is a means of protection 
against industrial strife and is a central component in the CBA relationship. 72 Thus, the Wiley 
Court believed that, in examining successor employer disputes, a balancing test must be applied 
that attempts equally to protect employees from a sudden change in the employment relationship 
and unconsenting employers from being bound to a contract to which they were not a party. 73 
The Court stressed that under the principles of law governing ordinary contracts, an 
unconsenting successor could not be bound, but that a CBA is "not an ordinary contract" since 
national labor policy recognizes its importance. 74 
B. NLRB v. Burns International Security Services 
In Burns, the Court did not address whether a duty to arbitrate existed; instead, it looked 
to whether a successor employer could be bound by the substantive terms of the previous CBA. 75 
In Burns, Wackenhut Corporation ("Wackenhut") provided security protection services for 
Lockheed Aircraft Service Co. ("Lockheed") at one of its plants under a one-year service 
agreement. 76 Once the contract had expired, Lockheed called for bids from various companies 
supplying these services, and Burns International Security Services, Inc. ("Burns") outbid 
69 Meridian, 583 F.3d at 81 (Livingston, J., dissenting). 
70 See Wiley, 376 U.S. at 549. 
71 Id 
72 Id 
73 Id at 550. 
74 Id 
75 AmeriSteel, 267 F.3d at 269. 
76 Burns, 406 U.S. at 274. 
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Wackenhut, winning the security contract.77 Burns hired a majority ofWackenhut's employees 
already employed at the plant, but refused to honor the existing CBA between Wackenhut and 
the incumbent union.78 The union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor 
Relations Board (''NLRB"), and the NLRB ordered Burns to honor the Wackenhut CBA.79 
In its decision, the Supreme Court first found that Burns had a duty to recognize and 
bargain with the incumbent union because a majority of the employees hired were already 
represented by a union as a bargaining agent and the bargaining unit was unchanged. 80 
According to the Court, "[t]he source of [Burns'] duty to bargain with the union is not the CBA 
but the fact that it voluntarily took over a bargaining unit that was largely intact."81 
Second, the Court held that the successor employer, Burns, could not be bound against its 
will by the substantive terms of the pre-existing CBA. 82 In reaching this decision, the Court 
stated that Section 8 of the Labor Management Relations Act83 and legislative history of labor 
laws hold that "although successor employers may be bound to recognize and bargain with the 
union, they are not bound by the substantive provisions of a [CBA] negotiated by their 
predecessors but not agreed to or assumed by them."84 While recognizing the general principles 
underlying labor disputes, the Court held that the goal of preventing industrial strife did not 
override the "bargaining freedom of employers and unions."85 It reasoned that binding a 
successor employer to the substantive terms of a pre-existing CBA could result in "serious 
77 /d. at 275. 
78 !d. at 276. 
79 !d. 
80 !d. at 280-281. 
81 !d. at 287. 
82 /d. at 282. 
83 29 uses§ 158(8)(d). 
84 Burns, 406 U.S. at 274. 
85 !d. at 287. 
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inequities. "86 One such inequity is the restraint on the flow of capital because potential 
employers would be unwilling to rescue failing businesses if they cannot negotiate their own 
CBAs. 87 Finally, the Court held that contract terms between employers and unions should 
"correspond to the relative economic strength of the parties."88 Therefore, forcing successor 
employers into unconsented contracts would offset the "balance of bargaining advantage. "89 
Burns provides ambiguous direction for the lower courts because it partially contradicts 
Wiley and does not address whether an arbitration clause comprises one of the substantive terms 
of a CBA.90 Wiley establishes that an unconsenting successor employer may have a duty to 
arbitrate with an incumbent union, by which means the substantive terms of the pre-existing 
CBA may be implicitly imposed on the successor.91 In spite of this, Burns holds that an 
unconsenting successor employer cannot be bound to the substantive terms of a pre-existing 
CBA, even if substantial continuity of identity exists. Such a holding leaves courts wondering if 
it is still acceptable to force successors to arbitrate and potentially be found liable for the CBA. 92 
Despite the glaring contradiction, the Court managed to provide some clues in 
reconciling the cases. The Burns Court suggested that Wiley occurred against a backdrop of state 
successor liability law, providing guidance on what, in addition to substantial continuity, is 
influential in compelling arbitration.93 Furthermore, the Court has identified two levels of 
liability for successor employers, the duty to arbitrate and the obligation to adopt substantive 
terms of a previous CBA. Burns provides guidance regarding the heightened duty to adopt a 
prior CBA, which typically occurs when the CBA provisions are assumed and under the alter ego 
86 !d. 
87 /d. at 287-288. 
88 !d. at 288. 
89 !d. 
90 AmeriSteel, 267 F.3d at 271. 
91 !d. at 270. 
92 !d. 
93 Burns, 406 U.S. at 286. 
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doctrine, and distinguishes the substantial continuity factor and how it applies to the successor's 
duties.94 
C. Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees 
Two years after Burns, Howard Johnson took up the issue of labor law successorship 
with many hoping that the Supreme Court would clear up the conflicting reasoning of Wiley and 
Burns.95 However, they were disappointed because the Court refused to "decide ... whether 
there [was] any irreconcilable conflict between Wiley and Burns."96 Instead, Howard Johnson 
simply answered the question of whether a new employer had a duty to arbitrate in a fact pattern 
that contrasted with Wiley.97 Where Howard Johnson succeeds is in its ultimate outcome and 
reiteration of salient factors to be used in determining where a successor employer has a duty to 
arbitrate. 
In Howard Johnson, Grissom, the predecessor employer, agreed to its sell equipment and 
lease its restaurant and motor lodge, which had all been operated by Grissom, to Howard 
Johnson.98 Howard Johnson did not agree to the CBA between Grissom and the incumbent 
union and hired only nine out of 53 of the union-represented, former Grissom employees.99 The 
union then filed an action against Howard Johnson citing its failure to hire all of Grissom's 
employees as an illegal "lockout."100 The union sought to compel Howard Johnson "to arbitrate 
the extent of [its] obligations to the Grissom employees under the bargaining agreements."101 
94 /d. at 282; 287. 
95 See AmeriSteel, 267 F.3d at 271. 
96 Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at256. 
97 AmeriSteel, 267 F.3d at 271. 
98 Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 251. 
99 /d. at 251-252. 
100 Id at 252. 
101 Id at 252-253. 
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In arriving at a decision, the Court chose to compare the salient distinctions between the 
facts presented in Wiley with the facts of the case at hand. 102 First, it emphasized the fact that 
Wiley involved a merger, "as a result of which the initial employing entity completely 
disappeared." 103 In contrast, Howard Johnson only involved the sale of some assets, and the 
original employer remained in existence.104 This distinction was significant because, in Wiley, 
state successorship liability law "embodied the general rule that in merger situations the 
surviving corporation is liable for the obligations of the disappearing corporation."105 
Recognition of such state liability law supports a finding of a duty to arbitrate because it "may 
have been fairly within the reasonable expectations of the parties."106 
Second, the Court stressed the importance of the fact that, in Howard Johnson, the former 
employer continued to exist, and accordingly the union "[had] a realistic remedy to enforce their 
contractual obligations[,]" whereas, in Wiley, the former employer ceased to exist, thus making 
arbitration essential between the union and the successor employer. 107 Third, and most 
important, in Wiley "the surviving corporation hired all of the employees of the disappearing 
corporation[,]" where in Howard Johnson, the new employer "hired only a small fraction of the 
predecessor's employees."108 
Accordingly, the Court found that, based on these factors, there was no substantial 
continuity of identity in the business enterprise before and after Howard Johnson became the 
new employer. Therefore, Howard Johnson had no duty to arbitrate under the CBA.109 
Furthermore, the Court shed additional light on the scope of the "substantial continuity" factor, 
102 Meridian, 583 F.3d at 71. 
103 Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at257. 
104 !d. 
105 !d. (quoting Burns, 406 U.S. at 286) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
106 !d. at 257. 
107 !d. 
108 !d. at 250, 258 (original emphasis included). 
109 !d. at 263. 
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in emphasizing that it includes "a substantial continuity in the identity of the work force across 
the change in ownership."110 The Court held that the requisite continuity of the work force was 
present in Wiley because a ''wholesale transfer" of employees occurred between employers; 
however, Howard Johnson does not meet this requirement because only a minority of employees 
were hired by the new employer. 111 
Howard Johnson did not make great strides, in terms of advancing and clarifying the 
successorship doctrine. Howard Johnson chose not to deal with the conflict of Burns and Wiley, 
and "instead walked a very narrow path."112 However, aside from its shortcomings, Howard 
Johnson did constructively underscore the importance of"substantial continuity." Howard 
Johnson's main contribution was its holding that a lack of substantial continuity would place a 
case outside the ambit of Wiley. 113 Howard Johnson merely applied the principles in Wiley to a 
situation where substantial continuity was easily recognized as not being present. In Howard 
Johnson, the Court "simply pointed out that, consistent with Wiley, and on Wiley's own terms, 
the lack of substantial continuity meant that the Court needed to look no further" in determining 
whether a successor must submit to arbitration against its wil1.114 Howard Johnson 
acknowledged and reinforced the policy outlined in Burns, in maintaining that a successor may 
be bound to arbitrate, but it will not be automatically bound to the substantive provisions of the 
predecessor's CBA or have any obligation to hire the predecessor's employees. 115 
llO Id 
111 Id 
112 AmeriSteel, 267 F. 3d at 271. 
113 !d. 
114 !d. at 272. 
115 !d. 
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IV. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
In the wake of the Successorship Trilogy, lower federal courts have had no difficulty 
following Burns' mandate, in finding that unconsenting successor employers are not bound by 
the substantive terms of their predecessors' CBAs. 116 However, they have struggled with 
reconciling the holdings of the three Supreme Court cases. 117 Specifically, the courts have 
struggled with applying the duty to arbitrate to successor employers. 118 In AmeriSteel, the Third 
Circuit emphasized Burns, in finding no duty to arbitrate on successors despite the "substantial 
continuity of identity" factor being satisfied. 119 The Third Circuit held that continuity is 
necessary but not sufficient to find a duty to arbitrate, and, in light of Burns, no substantive terms 
can ever be imposed by an arbitrator, thus rendering arbitration futile. 120 Later, the same 
problem presented itself to the Second Circuit in Meridian, where a circuit split was created after 
the court held that "substantial continuity of identity" was sufficient in finding a duty to arbitrate 
for the successor. 121 The following section will explain the current circuit split and how these 
lower federal courts interpreted the conflict in the Trilogy. 
A. AmeriSteel Corp. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters 
In AmeriSteel, AmeriSteel Corporation ("AmeriSteel"), a successor employer, purchased 
various assets of Brocker Rebar, the predecessor employer, including a manufacturing facility. 122 
A CBA existed between Brocker Rebar and its employees' union, but AmeriSteel repeatedly 
insisted that it was not bound to it and therefore, had no duty to arbitrate under its terms. 123 
However, AmeriSteel hired the majority of the union employees who had worked for Brocker 
116 See Id at 275-276. 
117 Id at 277-278 (Becker, C.J., dissenting). 
118 See generally, !d.; Meridian, 583 F.3d at 79 (Livingston, J., dissenting). 
119 AmeriSteel, 267 F.3d at 265. 
120 ld 
121 Meridian, 583 F.3d at 78. 
122 AmeriSteel, 267 F.3d at 265. 
123 Id at 266. 
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Rebar and, thus, was obligated to bargain with the union. 124 Bargaining broke down between the 
parties, and AmeriSteel refused to recognize the union. 125 Thereafter, the union requested 
arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause in the CBA. 126 AmeriSteel refused and sought to 
enjoin the union from proceeding to arbitration with AmeriSteel as a party. 127 
The Third Circuit attempted to navigate the Successorship Trilogy by examining each 
case individually. 128 In reviewing Wiley, the court found the holding to be limited to the merger 
context in which a predecessor employer disappears. 129 The Third Circuit then went on to 
identify "substantial continuity of identity" to be a necessary ingredient in finding a duty to 
arbitrate, yet not the sole factor in forcing a successor to arbitrate with the incumbent union. 130 
The court held that Howard Johnson did not resolve the conflict between Wiley and 
Burns, but believed that Howard Johnson did, however, make known the Supreme Court's focus 
when comparing Wiley and Burns. 131 Howard Johnson took "an expansive view of Burns, 
repeatedly extolling [Burns'] reasoning" and "downplay[ing] the significance of Wiley.'' 132 In 
reading the Trilogy, "Burns ... provides more persuasive guidance than the limited holding in 
Wiley." 133 In holding Burns in higher regard than Wiley, the court found that, if an unconsenting 
successor were held to arbitrate under an existing CBA, "the substantive terms of the CBA could 
be enforced, and thus Burns cannot survive intact."134 In applying Burns, the court found that 
AmeriSteel could not be bound by the substantive terms of the CBA; therefore no arbitration 
124 Id 
12s Id 
126 Id 
121 Id 
128 Id at 267. 
129 Id at 268-269. 
130 Id at 272, n.3. 
131 Id at 271-272. 
132 !d. at 272. 
133 !d. at 273. 
134 !d. at 272. 
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award granted to the union, which necessarily would be based on the substantive terms of the 
CBA, could receive judicial sanction. 135 Thus, AmeriSteel could not be obligated to arbitrate, as 
the arbitration would serve no purpose. 136 Since there is an inability to hold successor employers 
to the substantive terms of a former CBA, AmeriSteel was found to have no obligations under 
the Brocker Rebar CBA. 137 
B. Local 348-S v. Meridian Management Corp. 
In Meridian, Meridian Management Corporation ("Meridian") was awarded a contract by 
the Port Authority ofNew York and New Jersey to provide engineering and janitorial services at 
the Jamaica Air Train Terminal at John F. Kennedy International Airport. 138 Meridian elected to 
subcontract the janitorial services to Cristi Cleaning Services, Inc. ("Cristi") under a one-year 
contract. 139 At the time Meridian and Cristi entered the subcontract, Cristi had an existing CBA 
with a labor union representing its janitorial employees. 140 Meridian later lawfUlly terminated its 
subcontract with Cristi and decided to perform the janitorial services itself.141 In doing so, 
Meridian chose to retain the majority of the Cristi employees who had previously worked at the 
terminal. 142 The incumbent union then requested that Meridian recognize it as the bargaining 
representative for the employees.143 Meridian declined to do so and, in addition, refused to make 
CBA-mandated contributions to the union's Health and Welfare Fund.144 The union sought to 
compel Meridian to submit to arbitration as required by the CBA.145 Meridian, however, argued 
135 !d. at 274. 
136 !d. at 265, 274. 
137 !d. at 277. 
138 Meridian, 583 F.3d at 66. 
139 !d. 
140 !d. 
141 !d. 
142 !d. 
143 !d. at 66-67. 
144 !d. at 67. 
145 !d. 
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that it was not a party to the CBA, and it should not be bound by any of its terms, including the 
arbitration clause. 146 
The Second Circuit followed AmeriSteel' s methodology in first analyzing each case in 
the Successorship Trilogy to find whether Meridian was required to arbitrate the issue of whether 
and to what extent it was bound by the former CBA.147 However, unlike AmeriSteel, the Second 
Circuit determined the emphasis of the Trilogy to be the "central role of collective bargaining 
and arbitration in furthering the goals of national labor policy- specifically by avoiding 
industrial strife and encouraging the peaceful resolution of labor disputes."148 In particular, 
Meridian found the protection of workers from sudden changes in the employment relationship 
to be of paramount importance when examining the successorship doctrine. 149 
The majority in Meridian placed supreme importance, when considering whether a duty 
to arbitrate exists, on the issue of whether there existed substantial continuity of identity of 
business enterprise, with a singular emphasis on the composition of the work force. 150 With this 
in mind, the court held that the duty to arbitrate should not be limited to mergers, as in Wiley, and 
contended, instead, that continuity of identity can occur in a variety of situations.151 The court 
noted that Meridian hired the majority ofCristi's employees, who continued doing the same 
work in the same location that they had done for Cristi, and, therefore, found that there was a 
"substantial continuity of identity" between Meridian and Cristi.152 Further, the court 
highlighted that the employees had worked for Meridian the entire time, even though Meridian 
t46 Id 
147 /d. at 66. 
148 /d. at 72. 
149 Id 
150 Id at 74. 
151 Id 
152 Id at 74-75. 
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had no legal relationship with the workers, because Meridian was the general contractor when 
Cristi was performing under the subcontract between the parties. 153 
In considering these facts, the court found that, while Meridian's status as a successor 
employer does not automatically bind it to the substantive terms of the pre-existing CBA, it 
maintained substantial continuity of identity of business enterprise, including the composition of 
its work force, and, therefore, was required to arbitrate with the union under the terms of the 
former CBA. 154 Sufficient "indicia of substantial continuity" existed, so the issue of the extent to 
which a successor employer is bound by the substantive terms of a former CBA becomes a 
question for the arbitrator. 155 The court held that once submitted to arbitration, the arbitrator is 
"to bring his informed judgment to bear" in which, if any, of the provisions of the CBA will be 
imposed on the successor employer. 156 However, the court did not suggest any criteria for 
deciding this question, but did note that the arbitration procedure will follow the terms of the 
arbitration clause in the predecessor's CBA, so long as one exists. 157 The court found that 
enforcing a duty to arbitrate is the "most effective way to balance those interests recognized by 
the Supreme Court[,]" and is more effective than anything attempted or accomplished by the 
parties privately bargaining new terms to govern the relationship. 158 
The court concluded by recognizing and rejecting the Third Circuit's reasoning in 
AmeriStee/. 159 According to the Second Circuit, AmeriSteel "eviscerates the protection of 
employees represented by incumbent unions" and contradicts the holding of Wiley. 160 
153 ld at 75. 
154 Id at 66, 76. 
155 ld at 76. 
156 Localll15 v. B & K Investments, Inc., 436 F.Supp. 1203, 1208 (S.D. Fl. 1977); Burns, 406 U.S. at 286. 
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V.ANALYSIS 
While Meridian properly upholds the principle, expressed in Wiley, that an unconsenting 
successor employer can be bound to arbitrate under appropriate circumstances, the court errs in 
holding that a "substantial continuity of identity of business enterprise" is the only factor to 
consider in determining whether a duty to arbitrate exists. On the other hand, AmeriSteel 
ultimately provides the proper outcome in the circuit split, in holding that a successor is not 
bound to arbitrate when only a "substantial continuity of identity of business enterprise" exists. 
AmeriSteel correctly identifies "substantial continuity" as a "necessary ingredient," yet not the 
sufficient condition for finding a duty to arbitrate in a successor employer. 161 However, 
AmeriSteel fails to advance that logic in formulating its ultimate solution that no duty to arbitrate 
exists, and instead, contradicts Wiley, in forming an overbroad conclusion "that an arbitration 
clause of a CBA can never be enforced against an [ unconsenting] successor."162 AmeriSteel 
finds that the duty to arbitrate, found to be enforceable in Wiley, should not have been ordered 
because unconsenting successors cannot be forced to arbitrate when it will serve no purpose. 163 
In fmding that, as a logical consequence of Burns, a duty to arbitrate would be futile for 
unconsenting successors, AmeriSteel implies that Wiley has been overruled by Howard Johnson 
and Burns.164 However, the Supreme Court has never acknowledged overruling Wiley in either 
Burns or Howard Johnson, and only the Court or Congress may overrule its precedent, 165 not the 
161 AmeriSteel, 267 F.3d at 272, n. 3. 
162 !d. at 281 (Becker, C.J., dissenting). 
163 !d. at 265. 
164 !d. at 280. 
165 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997) (" [S]tare decisis does not prevent [the United States Supreme 
Court] from overruling a previous decision[.]" "[I]f a precedent of [the United States Supreme Court] has direct 
application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals 
should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to [the United States Supreme Court] the prerogative of 
overruling its own decisions.") 
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Court of Appeals. 166 Therefore, AmeriSteel arrives at a proper conclusion in not imposing a duty 
to arbitrate, but does so using flawed reasoning. 
On the other hand, Meridian properly recognizes Wiley's continued vitality, but 
erroneously applies and interprets its holding. Meridian "confuses the circumstances in which a 
'successor employer' has a duty to recognize and bargain with a labor union, with much more 
limited circumstances in which that employer is bound to arbitrate with a union under a [CBA] to 
which it has not agreed."167 In Meridian, the court held that the successor employer is obligated 
to arbitrate after simply meeting the "substantial continuity" test, which is the same standard 
applied in imposing a duty to bargain with an incumbent union.168 This interpretation would 
render the duty to bargain valueless because unions would have no interest in negotiating a new 
CBA, when an obligation to arbitrate, which would hold the successor to substantive terms of the 
old CBA, is imposed. Consequently, all successor employers who hire the bulk of a 
predecessor's employees would have a duty to arbitrate the extent to which they are bound by the 
prior CBA.169 
In forming a proper solution to the question of when successor employers should be 
obligated to arbitrate, the courts should flrst look to long-established standards, where successors 
have been held to the terms of the CBA.170 In doing so, a bright-line rule should be formed, 
which categorizes the various scenarios in which a duty to arbitrate will be found. A bright-line 
rule would, to a large degree, remove the confusion of the lower courts in applying the 
successorship doctrine. Under such a rule, a duty to arbitrate should be found when the 
successor employer: (1) implicitly or expressly assumes the CBA, (2) is an alter ego of the 
166 State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997). 
167 Meridian, 583 F.3d at 78-79 (Livingston, J., dissenting). 
168 !d. at 79. 
169 !d. at 80. 
170 !d. at 84. 
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predecessor, (3) merges with the predecessor employer, in a scenario where "substantial 
continuity" exists and the predecessor ceases to exist, or ( 4) satisfies both the "substantial 
continuity" test and another successor liability basis strongly favors and supports a reasonable 
expectation for imposing liability (e.g., supporting state law). 171 
Under the first two scenarios, the assumption of the CBA and the alter ego doctrine, the 
circuits widely agree that a successor employer adopts the former CBA, and, thus, a duty to 
arbitrate must naturally follow, along with all other obligations of the former CBA.172 The last 
two categories of the bright-line rule, however, are not as established as the former categories, 
and have never been a primary basis for imposing the entirety of the CBA on a successor 
employer. Historically, however, such factors have been considered to be important 
circumstances in finding a duty to arbitrate. 173 
Absent a finding of an alter ego successorship or assumption of the contract, the 
centerpiece of the analysis of when a successor can be bound to arbitrate is a finding of 
"substantial continuity of identity of the business enterprise."174 In Wiley, once the Court 
concluded that "substantial continuity" existed, it looked to other factors, such as common law 
successor liability rules, to support a duty to arbitrate. 175 Furthermore, in Howard Johnson 
nowhere does the Court state that "substantial continuity" is the sole basis for finding a duty to 
arbitrate. 176 Thus, the successorship doctrine treats "substantial continuity" as a "necessary but 
not sufficient condition for concluding that a successor employer is bound to arbitrate under a 
171 !d. at 84; Burns, 406 U.S. at 286 ("[The] narrower holding dealt with a merger occurring against a background of 
state law that embodied the general rule that in merger situations the surviving corporation is liable for the 
obligations of the disappearing corporation.") 
172 Meridian, 583 F.3d at 79. 
173 Wiley, 376 U.S. at 557. 
174 AmeriSteel267 F.3d at 280, n.l (Becker, C.J., dissenting). 
175 Wiley, 376 U.S. at 550. 
176 Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 256. 
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predecessor's CBA. " 177 As previously mentioned, in analyzing "substantial continuity of 
identity of business enterprise" the Fall River factors must be satisfied, and, as noted in Howard 
Johnson, a particular emphasis is placed on the "continuity of work force." 178 
In the merger context, so long as "substantial continuity" is satisfied and the predecessor 
employer completely disappears, a successor employer will have a duty to arbitrate. It is equally 
significant that the predecessor ceases to exist after the merger because, in the absence of the 
former employer, the union loses the party against whom they can bring employment disputes. 
The survival of the predecessor employer is key to protecting the interests of the workers 
because the union will have a "realistic remedy to enforce their contractual obligations" against 
the surviving former employer.179 Thus, merger, in this context, would erase the former 
employer and the workers' ability to resolve disputes; therefore the successor employer should 
retain a duty to arbitrate, so that the workers' rightful expectations are preserved. 
Finally, a duty to arbitrate should also be found also when both "substantial continuity" is 
met and common law successor liability rules exist, which support a reasonable expectation that 
the successor employer would be liable for the contract. 180 In Wiley, the Court emphasized that 
the state law background rule supporting liability for the successor employers under predecessor 
contracts was important to the result. 181 Such background successor liability rules, when 
sufficiently strong, can create a reasonable expectation of continuing liability; thus support exists 
for the central "substantial continuity" factor, in finding a duty to arbitrate. Each of the cases of 
the Trilogy refers to the state law background as support to "substantial continuity," 
demonstrating the Court has used this factor as a partial explanation in finding a duty to arbitrate 
177 Meridian, 583 F.3d at 83 (Livingston, J., dissenting) (original emphasis). 
178 Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at263. 
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and, also, does not consider "substantial continuity" to be an exclusive factor in determining 
when a duty to arbitrate exists.182 
Chief Judge Becker, dissenting inAmeriSteel, offered an alternate reconciliation of the 
Trilogy, suggesting a "sliding scale" approach for determining what can be imposed on 
successors.
183 He proposed that by using the Successorship Trilogy as a guide, burdens, ranging 
from no obligations to the imposition of an entire CBA, should be imposed on successors based 
on the corresponding strength of the successor relationship. 184 The dissent seems to base the 
"sliding scale" test mainly on the presence of a merger or sale of assets, not as much on 
continuity of work force, thus ignoring the central consideration in imputing a duty to arbitrate 
identified in Howard Johnson. 185 A "sliding scale" approach fails for multiple reasons. First, 
such a test is exceedingly imprecise, and especially in an unsettled area. 186 Second, due to its 
malleability, a sliding scale can be easily abused and used as an excuse for pushing forward 
various policy agendas by either pro-labor union or pro-employer courts. Third, there are only 
three tiers in the sliding scale (i.e., a duty to bargain, a duty to arbitrate, and an adoption of the 
terms of the predecessor's CBA); thus, the sliding scale ignores the standards for each of these 
obligations already established by the Supreme Court. 
By imposing a duty to arbitrate on successor employers solely based on the "substantial 
continuity" factor, Meridian complicates an already widely recognized problem in 
successorship.187 A finding of "substantial continuity" already imposes a duty to bargain on a 
successor; however, by Meridian's holding, such a ftnding now imposes, not only a duty to 
182 See !d .. ; Burns, 406 U.S. at 301-302; Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 263-264. 
183 AmeriSteel, 267 F.3d at 285 (Becker, C.J., dissenting). 
184 !d. 
185 !d.; Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 263-265. 
186 I.e., the successorship doctrine. 
187 McLeod, supra, at 285. 
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bargain, but also a duty to arbitrate. Imposing a duty to arbitrate in this context has a dangerous 
effect on the transactions by which a successor takes control of another business. An employer 
can become a successor and potentially become exposed to obligations, via a variety of 
transactions, such as a partial sale or total sale of assets, a lease, a subcontract, a competitive 
bidding process, a leveraged buyout, a stock purchase, or even a bankruptcy sale. 188 Thus, 
according to Meridian, in a multitude of common and frequent transactions, the heavier burden 
to arbitrate could now attach to a new employer, so long as "substantial continuity" is fulfilled. 
Even under the lesser burden to bargain, a trend of "union-avoidance" has previously been 
recognized in successor employer transactions. 189 Thus, by imposing a harsher duty to arbitrate 
on successors, Meridian exacerbates this risk, and, in turn, hurts the same labor unions and 
workers it attempts to protect in imposing a duty to arbitrate on successor employers. 190 
Successor employers "have no legal obligation to hire the old unionized employees or to 
even give them preference in hiring - even if the entity plans to continue doing the exact same 
work."191 So long as the successor hires a minority of the old unionized employees or less, the 
successor will not be bound by the CBA, nor will it even be compelled to recognize or bargain 
with the union at al1. 192 In effect, Meridian "[increases] the incentives for would-be successor 
employers to simply fire the unionized employees and start over[.]"193 Such an outcome "is 
hardly a manifest victory for the cause of organized labor[,]" since it effectively devastates the 
very industrial peace and employee interests that the court lauded as an overriding policy 
. 11 hi . 194 concern 1n a successors p crrcumstances. 
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Further~ the NLRA's antidiscrimination provision, Section 8(a)(3), which was designed 
to protect unionized workers from anti-union behavior, has been largely ineffective. 195 While "a 
new employer cannot refuse to rehire the old employees solely because they are in a union ... 
employers will often be able to find ample business reasons to justify refusing to rehire old 
employees."196 A mass non-hiring of predecessor union employees is typically not taken as 
sufficient in finding a discriminatory dismissaL 197 Instead, there must be direct and substantial 
evidence of anti-union sentiment by the successor employer, and this kind of evidence is seldom 
available from sophisticated employers. 198 Thus, although perhaps suspicious, a successor 
employer has the right to refuse to hire an experienced, unionized work force, in favor of 
unskilled employees without violating Section 8(a)(3). 199 Not only will such behavior displace 
skilled laborers causing industrial strife, strikes, and increased unemployment, but also will 
result in social turmoil and additional expenses for the employer.200 
Even in avoidance of the lesser duty to bargain, successor employers have gone to great 
lengths by incurring added expenses and devising strategies to avoid hiring predecessor 
employees. 201 When skilled laborers have been dismissed in favor of a largely inexperienced 
work force, so that successor liability is avoided, a greater number of laborers are needed to do 
the jobs of former employees, resulting in lower productivity and greater inefficiency. 202 For 
example, at a meatpacking plant, where union workers were replaced by inexperienced laborers, 
the substitutes were 90% slower and turned out to be so incompetent that the meat had to be 
195 McLeod, supra, at 297-298. 
196 Meridian, 583 F.3d at 86 (Livingston, J., dissenting). 
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destroyed.203 Such problems can also result in unnecessary expenses for the successor in 
defending a garden-variety of tort claims, such as product liability and workplace injuries, 
increased training expenses of inexperienced workers, and recruiting expenses in finding 
substitute employees. Thus, Meridian, creates a greater incentive for anti-union hiring behavior, 
so that "substantial continuity" is not apparent, and all union obligations associated with a CBA, 
to which the new employer was not a party, can be avoided. 
Moreover, a duty to arbitrate could deter employers from even venturing into a successor 
transaction. The imposition of a duty to arbitrate may discourage and inhibit the transfer of 
capital. 204 Corporations may be reluctant to acquire other businesses if they believe they might 
be saddled with the other corporation's CBA.205 Additionally, by imposing a duty to arbitrate, 
under the same standard used to find a duty to bargain, the obligations found in arbitration may 
not correspond to the relative economic strength of the parties.206 Instead, when "substantial 
continuity" is satisfied, it is best to balance the bargaining advantage between employers and 
unions by the economic powers of the parties. 207 Labor policy is ill-served by binding parties to 
terms that do not correspond to the economic strengths of the parties.208 For example, by 
imposing a duty to arbitrate, a union may be forced to retain terms that were made to a smaller 
employer, that are customized to those particular circumstances, and which it would not want 
imposed if a larger or more financially robust firm should acquire the business?09 Under such a 
scenario, a duty to bargain would better serve both parties rather than a duty to arbitrate. 
Therefore, unwanted consequences likely will result from the imposition of Meridian's 
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erroneous holding, which imposes a harsher duty to arbitrate under the same standard as a duty 
to bargain. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The successorship doctrine has long proven itself to be difficult to navigate, causing 
courts to confuse successor obligations, standards used to impose requirements, and national 
labor policy responsibilities. Therefore, unless the Supreme Court revisits this unclear area of 
law, the lower courts should adopt a bright-line rule, which firmly establishes when a duty to 
arbitrate should be imposed on successors. A bright-line rule eliminates subjective, and 
sometimes biased, pro-labor union or pro-employer interpretations of the Successorship Trilogy, 
which have further deepened the rift between the courts in applying a duty to arbitrate. Just as 
the Court set forth a factor-based test in imposing a duty to bargain, the same methodology 
should be applied to the duty to arbitrate, so that confusion can similarly be resolved. A bright-
line rule serves to create and enforce expectations of both labor unions and successor employers, 
where the parties will then enter certain transactions with the understanding of the unavoidable 
duties and liabilities that come with the territory. Thus, unionized workers' interests will be 
preserved when changes present themselves in innocuous employer transitions, and successor 
employers will be fairly held to anticipated duties and liabilities. In turn, a great deal of the 
"union avoidance" gamesmanship, naturally resulting from Meridian, will be stopped dead in its 
tracks, so that successors can continue to enjoy a symbiotic relationship with labor unions, where 
the employer gets the benefit of a highly-productive and skilled labor force and the work force 
can fairly bargain the terms of such employment. 
In effect, the toils and trials of the workingman would not be solved in their entirety; 
however, an unnecessary hemorrhaging of secured unionjobs can be avoided, thus preserving 
30 
another day and avoiding another dilemma in "the working, the working, just the working 
life."2IO 
210 BRUCE SPRINGSTEEN, Factory, on DARKNESS ON THE EDGE OF TOWN (Columbia Records 1978). 
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